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Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
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Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emer-
gence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do
depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local.
By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large,
the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong
in numbers to keep the “punishment pool” from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institution-
alized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if
second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous
phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the
competition against defectors.
The provisioning of social benefits or the preservation of
environmental resources relies on selfless contributions and
collaborative efforts [1–4]. Those that exploit such public
goods are therefore faced with individuals and institutions that
are prepared to sanction antisocial behavior [5–14] with the
aim of averting Hardin’s tragedy of the commons [15]. The
Achilles’ heel of punishment, however, is the fact that it is
costly, weighing heavily on the shoulder of those that already
fill the common pool [16–20]. In the presence of punishers,
the traditional cooperators, i.e., those that contribute to the
public good but do not punish, are therefore downgraded to
free-riders as well. This so-called second-order free-riding is
in many ways more prohibitive for the emergence and stability
of punishment then the traditional defectors [21–23]. Without
additional incentives and mechanisms that help sustain pun-
ishment, the second-order free-riders prevail over punishers,
thereby eliminating the threat of sanctioning. In well-mixed
populations, volunteering [24–26] can cause this unfortunate
scenario to unravel [27], as can coordinated efforts between
the punishers [28]. However, spatial structure, in contrast to
well-mixed interactions, may alone be sufficient to solve the
second-order free-rider problem [29, 30].
In spite of the predominantly positive acclaim, studies crit-
ically probing the effectiveness of punishment in promoting
collaborative efforts among unrelated and selfish individuals,
for example in conjunction with anti-social punishment [31–
33], indirect reciprocity [34] or social differences [35, 36], are
an important reminder of open questions still imbuing the sub-
ject. As a viable alternative to punishment, rewarding has re-
ceived substantial attention as well [37–40]. Although the ma-
jority of previous studies addressing the “stick versus carrot”
dilemma concluded that punishment is more effective than re-
ward in sustaining public cooperation [41], evidence suggest-
ing that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead
to higher total earnings without potential damage to reputation
[42, 43] or fear from retaliation are mounting [44, 45].
Here we also depart from the traditional model of punish-
ment by considering it not as an individually inspired act, i.e.,
peer-punishment, but rather as something that is inherent to
∗Electronic address: matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si
the population as a whole, i.e., pool-punishment. Although
both variants entail paying a cost for the free-riders to incur
a cost, by peer-punishment this is done after the public goods
game and is primarily an individually inspired effort, while by
pool-punishment contributions to the “punishment pool” are
summoned in advance. As pointed out in a recent study by
Sigmund et al. [46], the first experiment on public goods with
punishment [47] actually considered pool- rather than peer-
punishment. An important advantage of collecting resources
for punishment ahead of the collaborative effort, as in paying
towards a sanctioning institution, is the fact that second-order
free-riders are easily spotted and are thus submissive to be-
ing punished. Note that if everyone contributes to the pub-
lic good then second-order free-riders are not distinguishable
from peer-punishers. Pool-punishment alleviates this impor-
tant deficiency, and as a reported in [46], can prevail over peer-
punishment if second-order free-riders are punished as well.
Our model is based on the spatial public goods game (see
e.g. [48–52]) and entails punishers (P), cooperators (C) and
defectors (D) as the three strategies competing for dominance
on the square lattice. Notably, since we consider structured
rather than well-mixed populations, the option of volunteer-
ing [27] for stabilizing either cooperation or punishment is
not required [29]. Punishers and cooperators both contribute
equally to the public good. The resulting amount is multi-
plied by the synergy factor r > 1 and then divided equally
among the group members irrespective of their strategies. But
while punishers contribute an amount β also to the punish-
ment pool, the cooperators refrain from doing the same. Due
to their second-order free riding the cooperators are fined an
amount δγ, where δ ≤ 1 is a multiplication factor taking into
account the fact that their offence is lesser than the one com-
mitted by defectors. The latter contribute neither to the public
good nor to the punishment pool and are therefore charged for
the full amount γ.
Since institutions for governing the commons supposedly
act as the “invisible hand” looming over the whole popula-
tion, the free-riders are finned irrespective of their neighbor-
hoods, in particular, irrespective of whether they contain a
punisher or not. Likewise, contributions to the punishment
pool are summoned irrespective of the number of free-riders
in the population. This is an important distinction from previ-
ously studied spatial public goods games incorporating peer-
2punishment [53–56], where punishing costs and fines were de-
ducted from payoffs individually on the basis of strategies that
were present in a particular group at a given time. The non-
local character of pool-punishment allows for the introduction
of an account balance Σ for the punishment pool. If the con-
tributions of all the punishers cover the costs that are need to
punish all the free-riders in the population, i.e., if Σ ≥ 0, the
pool-punishment is said to be fully sustainable. Conversely, if
Σ < 0 the pool-punishment is unsustainable. Sustainability
is key for every institution to remain in existence, and sanc-
tioning institutions should be no exception to this assertion.
In exceptional cases even a small amount of punishers, al-
though technically unable to sustain Σ ≥ 0, can still ensure
enough resources to punish free-riders, for example by means
of lobbying or loans and similar financial mechanisms. Such
situations can be dubbed accordingly as being conditionally
sustainable, and we will make note of them when presenting
the results.
Beforehand, our main discoveries for a society facing pub-
lic goods games with pool-punishment may be summarized
as follows. First, we show that the spatial structure can re-
solve the second-order free-rider problem in case of institu-
tionalized punishment. Without any additional assumptions
or strategic complexity, pool-punishers can fully eliminate co-
operators. This happens by means of a discontinuous phase
transition leading to an outbreak of sustainability, either full or
conditional, depending further on the punishment fine and the
synergetic effects of collaborative efforts. Second, sustainable
pool-punishment is possible exclusively if second-order free-
riders go extinct. Only beyond the discontinuous phase tran-
sition, by means of which cooperators are eliminated, can the
punishers keep the punishment pool from emptying and main-
tain a positive balance. Importantly though, the elimination of
second-order free-riders is only the necessary but not the suf-
ficient criterion for full sustainability of pool-punishment. For
small punishment fines and modest synergetic effects of col-
laborative efforts the defectors can still overburden the sanc-
tioning institution, leading to a conditionally sustainable state
only. Remarkable nevertheless is the fact that by appropriate
conditions up to half of the population may be defectors, and
still the pool-punishment remains fully sustainable. This is in
sharp contrast with the fact that even a minute fraction of co-
operators precludes sustainable institutionalized punishment,
and strengthens the perception that not the defectors but rather
the second-order free-riders are the ones that compromise the
success of punishment the most.
Results
In the absence of punishment cooperators survive only if
r > 3.74, and crowd out defectors completely for r > 5.49
[48]. These can be used as benchmark values for evaluating
the impact of pool-punishment on the evolution of cooperation
in structured populations.
Focusing first on the r − γ parameter plane, we present in
Fig. 1 full phase diagrams and the corresponding dependence
of the punishment pool balance Σ for two different values of
δ. Panels (a) and (b) feature results for δ = 1.0, implying
that second-order free-riders are punished equally strong as
defectors. This is a common assumption, although the of-
fence committed by cooperators, who contribute to the pub-
lic good but abstain from punishing, is actually smaller than
the one committed by defectors, who free-ride on both occa-
sions. It can be observed that below a critical fine γ = 1.0
punishers cannot survive, and accordingly, the spatial grid is
dominated by defectors or a mixed C+D phase, depending
on the value of r. Since cooperators and defectors are pun-
ished equally, the absence of punishers transforms the public
goods game into its traditional two-strategy variant where the
value of γ merely rescales the payoffs but does not influence
the outcome. In this sense, it could be assumed that punish-
ment is not executed at all if punishers die out without this
affecting the presented results. Accordingly, r = 3.74 [48]
is recovered as the critical synergy factor above which coop-
erators can survive. For γ > 1.0, however, cooperators are
subverted by punishers via a discontinuous phase transition.
With their emergence, collaborative efforts can be sustained
also for r < 3.74, whereby the larger the fine the smaller the
synergy factor needed to achieve this. Pertaining variations in
sustainability, evaluated by means of the punishment pool bal-
ance Σ, are depicted in panel (b). The elimination of second-
order free-riders is clearly a necessary condition that needs to
be fulfilled for pool-punishment to be sustainable. In addition,
however, the fraction of defectors in the P+D phase needs to
be sufficiently small. The region of full sustainability, where
Σ > 0, is delineated with a dash-dotted gray line, while con-
ditional sustainability characterizes the remainder of the P+D
phase. There the high fraction of defectors in the P+D phase
precludes positive values of Σ.
Complying with the proposition that cooperators should be
punished more leniently than defectors, we set δ to 0.5, which
implies that the fine for second-order free-riding is half the
one for defecting. Results presented in panels (c) and (d) of
Fig. 1 qualitatively agree with those presented for δ = 1.0 in
panels (a) and (b). A distinctive feature is that the critical fine
at which the discontinuous phase transition C +D → P + D
occurs is now two times larger, i.e., γ = 2.0. Borders of con-
ditional and full sustainability move towards larger γ accord-
ingly. It is important to note that in the absence of cooperators
δ has no effect on the evolution of the remaining two strate-
gies. For γ > 2.0 the results in panels (c) and (d) are therefore
identical to those presented in panels (a) and (b). Conversely,
for γ < 2.0, where punishers cannot survive, the competition
between cooperators and defectors is no longer unaffected by
γ as was this the case for δ = 1.0. Since here defectors are
punished with the full fine while cooperators with only half of
it, larger values of γ decrease the critical synergy factor r that
is needed for cooperative behavior to remain in existence.
Since the discontinuous phase transition C + D → P + D
is crucial for the sustainability of pool-punishment, we pro-
ceed by examining the evolutionary process at both sides of it
in detail. Panels (a), (b) and (c) of Fig. 2 depict characteris-
tic snapshots of the spatial grid that eventually lead to a sta-
ble C+D phase, while panels (e), (f) and (g) depict snapshots
leading to a stable P+D phase. Although the final outcome
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FIG. 1: Phase diagrams (a,c) of the spatial public goods game with punishers (P), cooperators (C) and defectors (D), and the resulting
pool balance Σ (b,d) on the r − γ parameter plane. In (a) and (b) δ = 1.0 while in (c) and (d) δ = 0.5. Black solid (dashed) lines depict
continuous (discontinuous) phase transitions. Color mapping in the phase diagrams (a,c) encodes the density of punishers in the P+D region
and the density of cooperators in the C+D region. Pure P and D phases are depicted red and blue, respectively. In (b) and (d) the color map
encodes the punishment pool balance Σ pertaining to the phase diagrams on the left. The phase separation lines are depicted for reference as
well. Gray dash-dotted lines delineate the region of full sustainability, i.e., Σ ≥ 0, while the region where ρP > 0 and Σ < 0 is denoted
as conditionally sustainable. Irrespective of δ, sufficiently large r and γ can stabilize pool-punishment by means of a discontinuous phase
transition at which punishers replace cooperators in the coexistence with defectors (C + D → P + D) or via a continuous phase transition
where D→ P+ D. If second-order free-riders are punished equally strong as defectors (a,b) the critical fine at which the discontinuous phase
transition occurs is smaller than if cooperators are finned only half as strong as defectors (c,d). Accordingly, in (a) and (b) both sustainability
regions extend further towards smaller γ, albeit shifting towards ever larger r as well. The emergence of the P+D phase shifts the sustenance
of collaborative efforts toward smaller r as γ increases. This can be observed best for δ = 1.0, where the punishment of cooperators and
defectors is equally strong, and hence in the absence of punishers their coexistence is independent of γ. However, as soon as punishers subvert
cooperators at γ = 1.0 by means of a discontinuous phase transition, the cooperative behavior starts existing also for r ≤ 3.74. Qualitatively
identical features can be observed for δ = 0.5 (c,d). Results in all panels were obtained for β = 1.0 and K = 0.5.
in this two cases is remarkably different, the difference in the
fine γ that is needed for this to happen is minute, which is a
characteristic feature of a discontinuous phase transition. Re-
sults in panels (d) and (h) illustrate this phenomenon in terms
of the densities of punishers ρP (solid green) and cooperators
(dashed blue) ρC over time. What promises to be an iden-
tical evolutionary process at 100 full Monte Carlo (MC) it-
eration steps [compare (a) and (e)], slowly diverges [see (d)
and (h)] towards two very different but stable results. At 1000
full MC steps the snapshots already hint decisively in favor of
either the cooperators (b) or the punishers (f), depending on
the value of γ. At 10000 full MC steps the stationary state
in both cases is reached, where the full magnitude of the dif-
ference is revealed. For γ = 1.99 (c) the cooperators com-
pletely subvert punishers to form a stable coexistence phase
with defectors (red), while for γ = 2.01 (g) the punishers
prevail and eliminate the second-order free-riders completely.
Panel (i) illustrates the workings of the discontinuous phase
transition in terms of the punishment pool balance Σ, which,
after a substantial period of equivalence, turns unsustainable
for γ = 1.99 (dashed orange) and sustainable for γ = 2.01
(solid yellow).
Different outcomes of the proposed spatial public goods
game with pool-punishment can be understood better still if
considering δ and γ as the two variable parameters by a given
value of r. Figure 3 features the full δ − γ phase diagram
(a) and the corresponding color encoded stationary fraction
of defectors ρD (b) for r = 3.4. The phase diagram has a
markedly webbed structure, indicating the possibility of sta-
ble pure P, C and D phases, as well as stable mixed P+D and
C+D phases. All but the C+D→ P+D phase transition are
continuous, as indicated by the black solid lines. The discon-
tinuous phase transition is depicted dashed gray, whereby the
line corresponds exactly to δ = β/γ, which can be obtained
4FIG. 2: Characteristic snapshots of the square lattice and time courses of strategy densities close to the discontinuous phase transition
at γ = 2.0. Panels (a), (b) and (c), obtained for γ = 1.99, depict snapshots leading to the coexistence of cooperators (blue) and defectors
(red). Time courses in (d) show the pertaining elimination of punishers (green) at the expense of second-order free-riders (dashed blue). Just
on the other side of the discontinuous phase transition, at γ = 2.01, panels (e), (f) and (g) depict snapshots leading to the coexistence of
punishers (green) and defectors (red). Accordingly, the two time courses in (h) show the pertaining elimination of second-order free-riders
(dashed blue) at the expense of punishers (green). Panel (i) depicts the time evolution of the punishment pool balance Σ for γ = 1.99 (dashed
orange) and γ = 2.01 (yellow) towards unsustainability (Σ < 0) and sustainability (Σ > 0), respectively. Snapshots were taken at 100 (a,e),
1000 (b,f) and 10000 (c,h) full Monte Carlo (MC) steps. Note that at ±0.01 distance in the value of γ from the discontinues phase transitions
the system can actually be considered as being far away from it. Setting γ an order of magnitude closer to the transition point would prolong
the equilibration time dramatically. The horizontal axis in (d,i,h) is logarithmic. Results in all panels were obtained for r = 4.0, δ = 0.5,
β = 1.0 and K = 0.5.
by equating PP and PC (see Methods). Thus, it implies equiv-
alence of punishers and cooperators. Above the line punishers
should outperform cooperators, while below the line coopera-
tors should prevail. Due to the locally independent introduc-
tion of pool-punishment, this well-mixed approximation is ac-
curately reproduced by the numerical simulations of the spa-
tially structured model. Panel (b) features the pertaining re-
gions of conditional (dashed gray) and full (dash-dotted gray)
sustainability. For sufficiently large (small) values of γ (δ)
the δ = β/γ dependence agrees perfectly with the emergence
of full sustainability, and thus confirms that the elimination
of second-order free-riders is a necessary condition for insti-
tutionalized punishment to be sustainable. Before reaching
the P + D → D phase transition line from above, the pool-
punishment becomes conditionally sustainable only (Σ < 0
and ρP > 0), whereby the discontinuous phase transition on
the left still remains an accurate delineator of this region. The
color encoded values of ρD in (b) illustrate that under appro-
priate conditions up to half of the lattice my be occupied by
defectors and still Σ remains positive. This is in stark con-
trast with the fact that even a minute fraction of cooperators
precludes the possibility of sustainable institutionalized pun-
ishment, and leads to the conclusion that not the defectors
but rather the second-order free-riders are the ones most pro-
hibitive for its success.
Discussion
Over-fishing, environmental pollution, depletion of natu-
ral resources, or the misuse of social security systems, are
prime examples of the exploitation of public goods. We as hu-
mans, although being notoriously famous for cooperative be-
havior, are also likewise famous for exceeding resources that
are readily available to us, despite the fact that later genera-
tions may pay for our misbehavior greatly. Identifying what
works most efficiently in leading us away from antisocial be-
havior is therefore of the outmost importance. Punishment,
either peer or pool based, is weaved in our history records as
something that can foster collaborative efforts and keeps our
egos in check. However, in the light of pro-social behavior,
punishment can be regarded as just another public good that
needs our selfless side to shine through. How and why pun-
ishment emerges and can be stabilized appears therefore to be
a translation of above-mentioned problems into a single one,
which if effectively solved, will solve also all the other ones.
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FIG. 3: Phase diagram (a) of the spatial public goods game with punishers (P), cooperators (C) and defectors (D), and the corresponding
density of defectors (b) on the δ − γ parameter plane. In (a) black solid lines depict continuous phase transitions. Dashed gray line depicts
the analytically predicted γ = β/δ discontinuous phase transition line, which agrees perfectly with the numerical results. Color mapping
encodes the density of punishers in the P+D region and the density of cooperators in the C+D region. Pure P and D phases are depicted red and
blue, respectively. In (b) the color map encodes the stationary density of defectors pertaining to the phase diagram on the left. Gray dash-dotted
line delineates the region of full sustainability, i.e., Σ ≥ 0, while the region where ρP > 0 and Σ < 0 is denoted as conditionally sustainable
and delineated with dashed gray. Note that defectors need not die out completely for pool-punishment to be fully sustainable. Remarkably, in
the absence of second-order free-riders as much as half of the lattice may still be occupied by defectors when Σ ≥ 0. Results were obtained
for r = 3.4, β = 1.0 and K = 0.5.
Yet it is a fruitful and gratifying approach allowing us to cap-
ture the essence of the problem and investigate, primarily by
means of minimalist but relevant models, the hows and whys
of the evolution of cooperation and social norms [57–59].
Here we have demonstrated that such a model can ex-
plain the emergence and stability of institutionalized punish-
ment. In particular, we have shown that the elimination of
second-order free-riders through spatially structured interac-
tions paves the way for sustainable pool-punishment if accom-
panied by sufficiently large fines and synergetic effects of co-
operation. Second-order free-riders are thereby eliminated by
means of a discontinuous phase transition that shifts the evolu-
tion rather explosively in favor of the punishers. Although this
discontinuity is due to the simplified assumption of uncondi-
tional punishment, and partially contradicts with real-life ex-
perience in that it prohibits a stable coexistence of second-
order free-riders and punishers, it nevertheless outlines a suc-
cinct and viable solution of the second-order free-rider prob-
lem that is in line with recent advances [46]. Altogether, the
presented results strengthen the established importance of the
spatial structure in promoting collaborative efforts [60–62] as
well as in stabilizing punishment [29, 53], and suggest that
elaborating further on the particularities of pool-punishment
in structured populations, especially with methods of statisti-
cal physics [63, 64], may improve our understanding of the
origin of institutions.
Methods
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Players play the game with
their k = 4 nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each individual
belongs to five different groups containing five players each.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a pun-
isher (sx = P), cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D)
with equal probability. Using standard parametrization, the
two cooperating strategies P and C contribute 1 to the public
good while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all con-
tributions in each group is multiplied by the factor r > 1, re-
flecting the synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting
amount is equally divided among the k+1 members irrespec-
tive of their strategies.
Pool-punishment requires allocating resources by means of
which free-riders can subsequently be punished. Each pun-
isher therefore contributes an amount β to the punishment
pool that is subtracted from its payoff. Since the resources
for pool-punishment are actually committed before the col-
laborative effort, both free-rider types are exposed. Cooper-
ators, whose second-order free-riding can stay undetected by
peer-punishment, are spotted just as readily as the defectors.
The amount withheld from the common pool by defectors is,
however, larger than the one withheld by cooperators. To take
this into account and enable “fair punishing”, each defector
is punished with a full fine γ, while the fine for second-order
offenders is reduced by a multiplication factor δ ≤ 1. Denot-
ing the number of punishers (P), cooperators (C) and defectors
(D) in a given group g by NP, NC and ND, respectively, the
payoffs
P g
P
= [r(NP +NC)− β]/(k + 1)− 1,
P g
C
= [r(NP +NC)− δγ]/(k + 1)− 1 and
P g
D
= [r(NP +NC)− γ]/(k + 1)
are obtained by each player x depending on its strategy
sx. Since pool-punishment corresponds to an institutional-
ized system that operates population-wide irrespective of lo-
cal considerations, the costs and fines are subtracted from the
appropriate players irrespective of their neighborhoods. This
6unconditional execution of punishment takes into account the
“invisible hand” of justice looming over the free-riders. Al-
though being a simplification (for an alternative treatment see
[65]), it accounts for the fact that the same effect is missing
by peer-punishment, where the threatening omnipresence of a
sanctioning institution is absent and the execution of punish-
ment is therefore neighborhood-dependent. However, since
punishers contributing to the punishment pool may not be
strong enough in numbers to actually gather enough resources
to punish all the free-riders in a population, the necessity to
assess the sustainability of pool-punishment emerges. The ac-
count balanceΣ = βρP−γ(δρC+ρD) of the punishment pool
is thus defined, where ρsx are the stationary fractions of strate-
gies on the L× L square lattice. If Σ ≥ 0 the pool has a zero
or positive balance, and thus the pool-punishment is said to
be sustainable. Conversely, if Σ < 0 the resources needed to
execute punishment exceed the contributions to the pool, and
accordingly, the pool-punishment is unsustainable. It is also
possible to argue that even a small amount of punishers can
still ensure enough resources to punish free-riders. Situations
where ρP > 0 and Σ < 0 can be referred to appropriately as
being conditionally sustainable.
The stationary fractions of punishers ρP, cooperators ρC
and defectors ρD on the square lattice are determined by
means of a random sequential update comprising the follow-
ing elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x
plays the public goods game with its k interaction partners
as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , 5 groups it belongs to.
The overall payoff it thereby obtains is thus Psx =
∑
g
P g
sx
.
Next, one of the four nearest neighbors of player x is cho-
sen randomly, and its location is denoted by y. Player y also
acquires its payoff Psy identically as previously player x. Fi-
nally, player y imitates the strategy of player x with the proba-
bility q = 1/{1+exp[(Psy −Psx)/K]}, where K determines
the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions or its inverse
K−1 the so-called intensity of selection [66]. In the K → 0
limit player y unconditionally imitates player x if Psy > Psx .
Conversely, in the K → ∞ limit all information about the
payoffs is lost and player y changes its strategy by means of
a coin toss. Without the loss of generality we set K = 0.5
[48], implying that better performing players are readily imi-
tated, but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player
performing worse. Such errors in judgment can be attributed
to mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation
of the opponent. Each full Monte Carlo (MC) step involves
all players having a chance to adopt a strategy from one of
their neighbors once on average. Depending on the proximity
to phase transition points, the linear system size varied from
L = 200 to 1600 and the equilibration required up to 106 full
MC steps for the finite size effects to be avoided.
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